In part one of our look at testing and related subject matter, we analysed the HRC effort and the effect preparation and politics can have on your season. In part two, we turned the spotlight on Yamaha and examined the Rossi and Burgess factor, looked at the arrival of Colin Edwards II to the works team and reminisced about the 'birth' of the 2004 M1 motorcycle.

In this, the third instalment of our mini-series, we will look at Ducati's approach to introducing a new bike, their switch to Bridgestone race rubber and just where in the 2005 pecking order the Bologna bullets may end up.

So, down to business, and we start with a question. Just where did it all go wrong for Ducati in 2004?

You have to opine that it DID go wrong because it wasn't until the last two Grand Prix of the season that the Desmosedici carried either of it's riders to a podium finish, Loris Capirossi at Phillip Island and the farewell podium for the factory from Troy Bayliss at Valencia.

Well, this is a tough old world we live in and the MotoGP paddock is as tough a place as any in professional sport, certainly when you consider the profile of the series right now. With MotoGP taking the spotlight exposure wise from Formula 1, the repercussions of a poor start to a season can be felt factory wide, grid wide and grandstand wide at each circuit the series travels to and it's splashed across our television screens with great regularity.

The political, financial, marketing and sponsorship implications alone to a stuttering start, or even a poor season in totality, are staggering. Any mistake, floundering performance, rumour based hiccup or out and out failure is pounced upon with vigour, such is the microscopic environment all teams operate under in this current age of see all, explain all. The media circus spares no blushes and with competition within that medium as competitive as it is, there is no place to hide.

With the philosophy of the Ducati Desmosedici project being a total integration between engine, chassis and rider, where did they go wrong? Was it bad preparation or was it a combination of things that led to the horrendous early and mid season form?

Well, the ethos of the project wasn't flawed, not after the performances in 2003 proved the factory could make an instant impact against the likes of Honda and Yamaha. The four-stroke knowledge born and bred out of the Superbike success the factory has achieved was still there and the hard work and dedication needed to bring about such success at the highest level, Grand Prix, was still very much in evidence.

The situation seemed to be a minefield right from the first outing of the GP-4 during winter testing. From the outside looking in it looked as if Ducati had basically bitten off more than they could chew with a 2004 spec bike that sported a brand new chassis, new suspension, new exhaust system, a refined ignition system and an aero package a leap away from the 2003 GP-3 model. Add to that the fact that 65% of the 915 integral parts on the GP-4 were new and non-interchangeable with its predecessor; you had what added up to a totally new machine in physical dynamic.

The 2004 spec engine didn't appear to be the main problem as the power plant had increased its outright power outage by 10bhp and 500rpm which kicked out a little over 230bhp at 16,500rpm although increased power does present you with the obvious challenges, the tires and their performance being the most glaring example. The V4 engine seemed to be the least of their problems, at least early in the season. It was the handling that appeared to be nothing short of disastrous and both riders looked to be riding a rollercoaster, not a highly refined racing prototype.

The engine itself in design is a thing of beauty. For those that need a little background, Ducati settled upon the V4 engine, mimicking Ducati's traditional L-configuration V-twin layout, and incorporated their acclaimed desmodromic valve operation system. They were clearly attempting to combine elements of tradition as well as innovative ideas, the whole point, some would say of MotoGP. The engine was named 'Desmosedici' because it has 16 valves -- Sedici is Italian for 16 -- and the valves are operated by the Desmo system.

That Desmo system is a work of art, designed by legendary Ducati engineer Fabio Taglioni. It uses rockers to close as well as open valves, allowing particularly accurate valve operation, whatever the rpm. Desmo-driven valves also offer minimal power loss, especially in the low-to-medium rpm range, compared to other timing systems, especially pneumatic.

So, where did the problems start?

In my opinion, in 2004, they had no fall back position of actually having interchangeable parts, and with no hybrid machine as a possible replacement even short-term for the GP-4 bike, it left Ducati open to a big fall should, for the first half of the season the Desmosedici not make the grade. Unfortunately, in relative terms, it didn't.

It's a harsh reality but points mean prizes and that is as plain and simple to understand as the fact that night follows day. Should Ducati have taken a smaller step and improved and further developed the GP-3 and continued testing and refining the GP-4 with Guareschi and the development team back in Italy, possibly introducing it later in the season with the in-pulse engine in the frame?

Were the technical team asking themselves that self same question?

Should they have built a GP-3.5 for 2004 and addressed the power delivery/tire wear and handling difficulties of that bike and not leapt into the depths of design risk to the extent they appeared to with the GP-4? After all, they ended up with 30,000 km of testing on the GP-3 under their belts during 2003, surely a strong base to approach a hybrid bike from?

They appeared to create a Jekyll and Hyde scenario for themselves and sold out to technological advancement and high hopes over plain and simple 'get-it-done-ability' so prevalent in their historical scrapbook.

The GP-3, in the hands of the parts starved and cash flow strangled D'Antin team, showed itself to be more competitive especially with Ruben Xaus on board during the part of the season when the GP-4 was performing at its worst, a nightmare scenario. That placed the factory in a precarious position. After all, the development of the 2003 model can't have suddenly hit a wall with it only being a season old but Claudio Domenicali could hardly order the GP-4 scrapped and lose face by returning to the GP-3. And, in all fairness, mass production of the parts for the GP-3 had to be halted, as the factory couldn't afford to be rolling off integral parts for both specifications of the bike. The situation was a mind numbing one for sure.

So, you have to surmise, in retrospect, that with a hybrid GP-3/4 developed over the winter, and with an injection of Marlboro cash, and with the same 2003 line-up on board, they could have stayed in touch with the Honda's and the Yamaha's and gotten the problem child GP-4 sorted out on the test track. That might even have given the D'Antin team a much-needed helping hand in the development stakes of their customer bikes too. Great thing retrospect, isn't it?

The analysis above may draw some derisory comments and raised eyebrows from the 'I want progress NOW' brigade, but, think on a moment, and remember the arena that Ducati have moved to after dominating in the Superbike class and the pressures that brings to make the brand a successful entity. Sure, MotoGP is there for the advancement of technology and conceptual ideas are key to this end, but there is a fine line between failure and success.

The aforementioned Superbike success is one thing, greatly cemented in the history books of course, but still, the point is well made that Grand Prix is a whole different ballpark to be playing on. Going up against the established and ultra experienced might of the Japanese hierarchy with it's power base both politically and financially in Grand Prix is a grandiose step to take in anyone's book and against the backdrop of a hugely successful opening season in MotoGP, the level of desirability may well have out-weighed the level of achievable success with their new 'baby'.

Honda, the vanquishers of many a Grand Prix championship, were having teething problems with their 2004 spec RCV with the swing-arm, the rear linkage and the tires. If an established manufacturer such as Honda could falter slightly, then it should come as no surprise that Ducati were capable of finding progress difficult.

It appeared to me that the Ducati effort for 2004 in MotoGP had moved away from the fundamental thing that had seen them succeed so often before. They seemed to have taken a leap of faith too far and moved away from the simplistic yet thorough design, build, test and race ethos that had seen them stamp their authority on the WSC series. Their 2003 preparations with the GP-3 were as detailed and well prepared as any I have seen from a new project. The development team painstakingly drew on the skills of not only the likes of Bayliss, Hodgson and Guareschi but bedded in such people as Luca Gesparo, Corrado Cecchinelli and Livio Suppo to the very core of the project, and it worked.

They tested, re-defined, re-tested, re-evaluated, and carefully man-managed and continually pushed the boundaries of their new steed without just throwing fistfuls of Euros at it and hoping for the best. They also had that much sought after commodity for any new project, time. They had that loving, caring, nurturing slow-hand approach which was a throw back to the mentality first shown by the likes of Pierre Terblanche and more importantly Massimo Tamburini -- legendary Ducati designer during the pioneering Superbike days.

The factory didn't have nearly the same amount of test time with the GP-4 bike in the off-season last year, and even during the 2003 season with the test team, as they had in preparation for the GP-3. The attention to detail didn't drop away but the timing and application looked to have been hurried. It looked like the GP-4 was simply not ready and testing and racing at Grand Prix meetings is a big request, for anyone.

All this uncertainty over the 2004 bike had a visual impact in the garage. Those faces in the Ducati camp were not full of the same sparkle we saw during 2003. There were no smiles, the body language was tense, and the nervous wide-eyed stare at the timing screens certainly prior to Assen said it all. The appearance of living on hope shines through so visibly on your face when things aren't going to plan.

However, one thing you can never lay at the door of the Ducati factory is that they give up. The total opposite is in fact true. It wasn't going to be easy but they had to make changes, and changes they made. They introduced a twin-pulse engine and made revisions to the chassis. It still didn't work but they never gave up hope of finding a solution. The pain on the face of Troy Bayliss showed the strain. Still, they ploughed on and tested a new swingarm and chassis at Phillip Island shortly after the Grand Prix meeting and they got success at last. The handling improved, the engine reacted well to the newer body it was in and Bayliss looked like a new man at Valencia. It took them all year and revision after revision but they got there, and more power to them. Whatever else is said, and no matter how much success they had with the 916 superbike, you have to remember that 2004 was only the second year back in Grand Prix after a lengthy hiatus from the series. There may be no place to hide but some of the people that in my view over-criticized the team seemed to be forgetting that fact.

For 2005 it looks like they have learnt their lesson. The GP-5 is an evolution of that 2004 season ending bike and there are no major changes, there is no 'new' bike. There are upgrades of course. There have been a few revisions to the chassis, the swingarm and the engine control system, but nothing on the scale of the changes made prior to 2004. But, there has been a major change for the whole package. The Ducati factory will be running on Bridgestone tires this coming season. The data book can be thrown away as that data is effectively useless after this change of rubber manufacturer. All the hard work begins again in terms of data acquisition as Ducati aim to take Bridgestone to the next level and improve on the results that Suzuki, Kawasaki and of course Tamada had with the tires in 2004. The end of season tests in 2004 looked promising but Sepang is the first real acid test in the heat. How will the fiery engine treat the Bridgestone tires and how will Capirossi and new signing Carlos Checa find the product with the 'revised' GP-5? - Will 2005 bring about a change of fortune for the Italian team? We shall see, starting next week.

As we are starved of action until next week, we'll liven up your Friday and finish our little mini-series with a fourth instalment for you.

In Part four, we will look at Suzuki, Kawasaki and give you a brief summary of the remaining teams.